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1. Introduction
Just as the aviation system is complex and interrelated, so is aviation
safety. Aviation safety involves design of aircraft and airportsi training of
ground personnel and flight crew membersi maintenance of aircraft, airfields,
en route and terminal area navigation and communication facilitiesF definition
and implementation of Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs)l air traffic control
proceduresi and much more. Ultimately, every part of aviation has a safety
aspect. No other transportation mode has its safety record so rigorously
scrutinized. In part this is due to the general societal (and media)
fascination with infrequent large disastersi in part because U.S. legislators
have a personal interest in air safety, as they rely upon aircraft for their
seasonal commutes to Washingtony and in part because people in the industry
are aware that their paychecks ultimately depend on their customers'
perception that travel by air is as safe as possible. (Various airlines still
conduct aircraft familiarity classes for travelers who have a fear of flying,
although as the younger generation of Americans gains experience with
airlines, this particular phobia should become less prevalent.)
Aside from the industry's self-enforcement attempts, the Federal
government tries to assure safety of the traveling public through regulation.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NISB) investigates all major air
carrier accidents and subsequently makes safety recommendations to the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) - which the FAA may or may not choose to
accept. One of the long lasting standoffs in aviation safety is between the
NPSB (backed by Congressional committees), whose sole concern is safety,and
the FAA, which must also take the economics of safety regulations into
account-unless it wishes to run into a buzzsaw of industry reaction every time
it changes (or issues) a FAR. On the international side, the International
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Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) issues technical rules affecting aviation
safety, although such decisions as its upcoming ruling on twinjet aircraft
over-water flights may be tinged with economic considerations as well.
But for safety regulations, whether external or internal to the
aerospace industry, to make any sense, they must be grounded, to some degree,
in reality, i.e. they must be backed up by some technical, statistical, or
economic factors which people can address on their own merits. The more
quantitative the supporting data are for rule justifications or changes, the
greater the likelihood is that the regulations will be successfully
promulgated and accepted by industry.
Thus aviation safety analysis came into existence. Most broadly stated,
the purpose of safety analysis is to inprove safety. The spectrum of analysis
ranges from the investigative to the predictive. At one end of the spectrum
is the after-the-fact investigation of accidents and a search for causesi at
the other end is the attempt to seek out likely causes (or, more typically,
combination of causes) of system failure before the system is put into
operation. However, the great quandary of aviation system analysis is the
lack of sufficient data to make probabilistic statements - even while the goal
of this analysis is the elimination of the very accidents that provide the
data. Practitioners of classical statistics, who have grown up considering
probability as the likely outcome of an event based on a large number of
repeated trials, face a mental hurdle when asked to accept the concept that an
event which has never taken place can nevertheless be assigned a 0.95
probability of success. This is essentially the dichotomy between the
investigative and the predictive ends of safety analysis - one is based on few
accidents (but real accidents nonetheless), the other is based on more
subjective probabilities of system (and subsystem) failures.
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But safety analysts cannot throw up their hands and say that there is
insufficient data after only one accident occurs and simply wait for the next
one to happen. They must combine forces with their predictive brethren and
attempt to head off the next accident. Only when this becomes the rule will
aviation safety analysis rest on a sound base. Until this millennium,
however, much remains to be done to improve safety analysis at each end of the
analysis continuum, and also where the two occasionally intersect by chance.
The investigative techniques depend on data: of incidents, accidents,
near misses, and the like. The FAA, NASA, NSB, ICAO, aircraft manufacturers,
airlines, etc., all maintain various types of data bases, most of which are
imcompatible (in the sense that they keep track of slightly different
variables). A further complication is that some bases are computerized
(different data base management systems are usually involved) and some are
manual. The safety analyst, attempting to establish broad trends, is
inrediately faced with this incompatibility problem. Still, if the focus of
the investigation is'narrow enough (for example, a failure of a mechanical
part on a specific aircraft), it may be possible to extract enough information
from the various data bases to find a definitive cause. This is especially
true when the cause of the incident is, in fact, mechanical - it is here that
repeated failures should be noticed, isolated, and corrective action taken.
Flight International (1984) provides a typical example that an alert safety
analyst (or system) should have anticipated and caught:
"Mis-rigging of the baggage door operating mechanism
and the failure of the door warning arrangements to
give adequate warning of door safety led to the fatal
crash of a Dan-Air BAe 748-2A in June 1981, according
to the official report. The baggage door at the rear
end of the cabin, blew out and became fixed on the
tailplane, thus making the aircraft uncontrollable.
Subsequently, the wings were overstressed and suffered
structural failure.
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The condition of the door operating mechanism, says the
report, made it impossible to lock the door fully using
the outside handle. But it was probably by the outside
handle that the door had last been closed. Crew checks
failed to discover the fault because of "a combination of
shortcomings in the design, construction, and maintenance
of the door warning systems and the appearance of the
visual indications".
The report notes that there have been 35 instances of the
748 baggage door malfunction reported in the past".
Very rarely do accidents have such obvious design-induced crew error
precursors. Most accidents result from interactive causes, rather than one
specific factor, and one of the causes is, invariably, a human being - the
pilot, the air traffic controller, or the maintenance worker. These acts of
human beings do not fit readily into data banks, there to be identified by a
specific parts number, and the safety analyst must now switch to the other end
of the spectrum and try to isolate the sequence of events that lead to "pilot
error".
These accidents involving human performance usually turn out to be one-
of-a-kind events - and it should be the aim of the safety analyst to ensure
that they remain so. Data unavailability and incompleteness, however, are
always present and it is up to the skill (and luck) of the analyst to uncover
the sequence of events leading to the accident. If a procedural error is
found, it can be immediately correctedy more difficult are those amorphous
incidents where it is not at all clear why there was human error. (If it were
possible to obtain quantitative estimates of human performance, such as human
error rates per task, it would be a simple matter to incorporate them into
operational reliability equations to determine system reliability.) Just as
the role of analysis of incident and defect reporting systems should be to
find mechanical failures before they become accidents, the human incident
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reporting systems should be designed to cause humans to "confess" their
incidents so that the analyst can isolate potentially dangerous trends and
practices before they too become accidents. (The Aviation Safety Reporting
System (ASRS) managed by NASA is a step in the right direction.)
It is the purpose of this report is to discuss various aspects of
aviation safety analysis, ranging from general aviation to the public
transportation system, and then to make some recommendations for improving the
methodology of safety analysis.*
*This work was sponsored by the Department of Transportation's Transportation
Systems Center under Contract DI'RS-57-83-C-00065. The authors would like to
acknowledge the guidance and assistance of the contract monitor, Dr. Karl M.
Hergenrother of TSC.
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2. General Aviation - How Safe Is It To Fly In Those Little Planes Anyway?
Although an airline crash is always good for large press, radio and
television coverage, the typical general aviation accident is buried in the
back pages unless a news photographer happens to take a fairly spectacular
picture of the aircraft hanging in the treesi even then the story itself is
still not front page material. This may be due to the perennial news media
attention to occasional large accidents rather than repeated small onesl part
of it may also be the media's perception that people who go up in small planes
are taking their lives in their hands anyway - consequently it is not judged
particularly newsworthy when a GA accident occurs.
Certainly the aggregate statistics might make the case that a certain
amount of derring-do is required to use small aircraft instead of flying on
scheduled carriers. Table 1 shows in 1983 that the GA accident rate (per
100,000 hours) was approximately 35 times the scheduled Part 121 carrier rate
and 8 times the scheduled Part 135 carrier (i.e. commuter) rate. Fatal
accident rates were similar. The good news is that 1983 had the lowest GA
accident rate in the last ten years as shown in Table 2.
But is GA flying really a dangerous undertaking? Various studies have
concluded that private flying is on par (per hour of exposure) with
mountaineering, motorcycle racing, and rock climbing and can thus be
considered as a self-imposed hazard (Stratton, 1974). Of the causal factors
for some 30,000 GA accidents from 1971-77 in the NSB data base, 67% are
attributed to human factors, 14% to weather, 7% to the engine, 6% to the
airport, 3% to the airframe and the rest to miscellaneous causes. Similarly,
in the FAA's Accident Incident Data System (AIDS) (as of April 1983) of 32,712
records, 20,319 (62%) were related to human factors. Thus it is the pilot,
rather than the machine, who is largely at fault. Why do so many accidents
occur? Part of the answer may be a false perception of risk by the pilots.
Table 1
CARRIER AND GENERAL. AVIATION 1983 ACCIDENTS, FATALITIES *
PER 1000,000
AIRCRAFT HOURS
PER 100,000
departures
ACC I DENTS
TOTAL FATAL . FATA1I.TIFS
AIRCRAFT
HOURS Fl O1!N DFPARTURES TOTAL FATAL TOTAL FATAL
AIR CARRIERS
Air Carriers Operating
Under 14 CFR 121
14 6,534,000
7 256,000Nonscheduled
4,940,000 0.275 0.046 0.364 0.061
122,000 1,563 0.391 3.279 0.820
Air Carriers Operating
Under 14 CFR 135
Scheduled**
Nonscheduled 141
GENERAL AVIATION+ 2091
28
548
11 1,378,000
60 3,102,000
1049 32,766,000
2,166,000 1.23 0.15 0.78 0.09
4.55 0.90
9.43 1.67
+ Includes accidents involving aircraft flown under rules other than 14 CFR 121 and 14 CFR 135.
* Data not available.
## Rates are based on all accidents, including those involving operators not reporting traffic data to
the CAB. Exposure data estimate sources: CAB and FAA.
*** Source: NTSB
Scheduled
Table 2
ACCIDENTS, FATALITIES, GENERAL, AVIATION OPERATIONS *
1974-1983
ACCIDENTS
TOTAL FATAL
4234 689
4001 636
4023 662
4083 663
4218 721
3825 639
3597 622
3502 654
3216 578
3091 548
FATALTTTIES#
1327
1258
1226
1280
1558
1237
1252
1282
1161
1049
ATRCRAFT
1101t1S FLOWN
27,773,500
28,799,000
30,476,000
31,577,508
34,887,178
38,641,268
36,401,663
36,803,200
32,094,623
32,766,000
ACCIDENT RATES #
PER 100,000
AIRCRAFT HOURS
TOTAL FATAl.
15.2 2.47
13.9 2.20
13.2 2.17
12.9 2.10
12.1 2.06
9.9 1.65
9.9 1.71
9.5 1.78
10.0 1.79
9.4 1.67
P Preliminary data.
All operations other than those operated under 14 CFR 121 and 14 CFR 135.
# Suicide/sabotage accidents included in all computations except rates
(1974 - 2, 1975 - 2, 1976 - 4, 1977 - 1, 1978 - 2, 1979 - 0, 1980 - 1,
1981 - 0, 1982 - 3)
# Incoudes air carrier fatalities when in collision with General Aviation aircraft.
## Source of estimate: FAA
*** Source: NTSB
YEAR
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1883P
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Although pilots may be aware of the overall hazards expressed as risk per hour
of exposure, risk perception research indicates that "these comparisons will
often not be very satisfactory. People's perceptions and attitudes are
determined not only by the sort of unidimensional statistics used ... but also
by a variety of quantitative and qualitative characteristics - including a
hazard's degree of controllability, the dread it evokes, its catastrophic
potential, and the equity of its distribution of risks and benefits".
(Slovic, 1983) .
Thus pilots may not realize the great variety of risks involved in
different types of flying. Collins (1983) describes, admittedly based on
limited exposure data, a potential ranking of risks. Collins gives a ranking
of one to normal risk - clear daytime VFR flying. The rankings then range
from infinity (when flying and drinking are combined) to ten times the normal
risk for an IFR flight. This type of risk evaluation technique, if understood
by GA pilots, would appear to have the potential to greatly decrease GA
accidents and fatali'ties.
A more general safety issue is how much and how well pilot judgment and
attitude can be modified through training. In the AIDS/NrSB GA accident cases
causal and contributing factors include carelessness, inattention,
misjudgment, lack of self-descipline, lack of skills, lack of supervision,
recklessness, and various other kinds of mistakes. Many, if not most, of
these factors imply an unsafe attitude on the part of the pilots. Thus the
pilot's general attitude appears to be crucial factor in aviation safety, as
important potentially as learning piloting skills and maintaining proficiency.
Certainly the FAA is aware of this and sponsors weekly Aviation Safety -
Education Seminars for GA pilots around the country to counterbalance poor
instruction. The GA training programs are weak because of economic
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considerations. Since potential pilots want to minimize their training costs,
instructor pay is low. (Instructor pay is also low because of the large
demand for instructor jobs.) Consequently, instructors are minimally
qualified since they move on to better jobs after they gain experience. (GA
licenses are also issued with the minimum required hours, for economic
reasons.)
Computers may come to the rescue of the GA pilots and students.
Computer-aided instruction (CAI) in the form of scenarios written on
microcomputers for the student pilot (or for a refresher course) have the
potential to focus on those high risk areas identified by Collins. The
structure of the learning program would have to be interactive to allow the
students to make mistakes and fly themselves out of their difficulties, as
well as teaching the basic techniques of flying.
One step further is the idea of using simulators to complement CAI.
Simulators are used as a matter of course for teaching airline pilots to get
out of dangerous situations without sacrificing aircraft. Perhaps in GA pilot
training some simulator experience, coming after completing a CAI course or a
regular pilot license exam, could substantially reduce pilot error. On a
simpler level, one of the most popular software programs for home computers is
the "Flight Simulator", which is used by both game-playing and recurrent-
training participants.
Human factors aside, some 30% of GA accidents can be attributed to other
causes. For example, the Service Difficulty Reporting System (SDRS) of the
FAA contains Malfunction or Defect reports from the GA community [70% of the
total, or some 17,000 reports per year] plus Mechanical Reliability and
Service Difficulty Reports from the air carriers. The FAA uses the SDRS
primarily to help decide when to issue Airworthiness Directives (ADs).
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Because the data base is so large, a potentially interesting use of the SDR
System would be to attempt to determine whether any correlation can be
established between airworthiness defects and accidents, incidents and
fatalities. If such correlation could be shown to exist, then by creating an
alerting system from the GA data base, aviation safety could be substantially
improved. If any long-term trends can be established in the reporting of
defects, perhaps grouped by specific part and aircraft type, such trends, even
if not correlated with specific accidents, should lead to greater safety by
pointing to potential aircraft defects before accidents take place.
When a "new" defect is introduced, a series of reports occurs at an
increased rate in the SDRS. This would gradually provide evidence that a
"newl defect exists. However, it is difficult to design a system which would
automatically alert a safety analyst that a significant change has occurred,
since the recent small sample of the SDRS could be an unusual coincidence, due
to the random nature of defect reports. A pragmatic, rather than an
automated, alerting process may be more proper which would first cause human
intervention internal to the FAA (review and field work) before triggering a
formal FAA Airworthiness Directive to the GA community.
Finally, the recommendation summarized by Hurst (1982) remains valid.
Hurst addresses the issue of learning from accidents and incidents as follows:
"Investigation, analysis, modelling, and simulation
of aircraft accidents and incidents normally stop
with the determination of 'probable cause', most
frequently 'pilot error'. What caused the pilot to
err is seldom discovered and even less often stated
in accident reports, despite presentation of relevant
evidence in public hearings. Although physical
evidence of what happened in an accident is carefully
searched for, collected, re-assembled and analysed, and
the physical events are then modelled and re-created
through simulation, investigation of physiological and
behavioural events stops short of modelling and re-
creation through simulation..."
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This recommendation applies equally well to GA and air carrier
operations, which will be considered in the next chapter.
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3. Air Carriers - Safer than your home?
Airline pilots are fond of saying that the most dangerous part of their
workday is the automobile ride to the airport. As usual, there are statistics
which can be used to support or refute this statement, but there is no doubt
that the pilots perceive that they are safer in the air than on the ground.
(Certainly it is true that they are less likely to run into another vehicle up
there.) However, there is a huge discrepancy in accident statistics between
pilots who fly for pay and pilots who fly for fun. It appears that attitude
toward safety may be the a principal reason for this divergence. Vehicle
design may also enter into this situation, as well as training and the rules
for operating aircraft.
An aircraft consists of several systems, i.e. the structural, engine and
fuel, electrical, flight control, communication, and others. These systems
are designed for a safe life (tested to many times their expected useful life
and, as in the case of landing gears, replaced at regular intervals) or
designed to be fail-safe (or fault-tolerant) such that a single failure within
a system does not cause the complete system to become inoperative. In the
avionic system fail-safety is generally achieved through duplication (2,3 or 4
times) of units - for example, there are usually three Inertial Navigation
Systems (INS)on board, with the systems' output constantly voting to make sure
they agreep when one does not agree with the other two, the disagreeing one is
assumed faulty and its output is ignored. Where redundancy is not possible,
such as in the structural system, the system is designed such that failure in
one structural member leads to a redistribution of aerodynamic forces to
neighboring members, the "alternate load paths".
In general, aircraft designers make use of a risk analysis technique
known as failure modes and effects analysis (FMFA), an inductive analysis
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which details, on a unit by unit basis, all possible failure modes and
identifies their effects on each system. Thus possible single modes of
failure of each unit in a system are identified and analyzed to determine the
effect on neighboring units and the whole system, with probabilities of
occurrence assigned and the resultant criticality assessed (Henley, 1981).
(This analysis technique is, in effect, the inverse of what takes place during
an accident investigation.)
Designers have to make sure that an aircraft maintains its airworthiness
under all conditions, although there is no wholly safe aircraft - the required
redundancies would make it too heavy to fly economically. Designers also try
to minimize the effects of human error by anticipating problems that pilots
and mechanics might encounter, and, as much as possible, to solve them in the
design stage and thus build aircraft which can forgive the occasional errors
of the designers themselves, the manufacturers and ultimately, the operators.
All in all, quality control procedures account for about fifteen percent of an
aircraft's cost (Newhouse, 1982).
For example, the 747 was the first Boeing aircraft to have its own
safety engineering group, providing essentially an internal airworthiness
review (Ramsden, 1976). The aircraft was designed to be failure-tolerant from
the start, a principle that has helped the 747 in its remarkable safety
record, able to withstand such accidents as the San Francisco take-off
collision with the approach-light pier, which disabled three hydraulic systems
(of four) and two (of four) main undercarriage trucks. Boeing's customer
support department also has accident officers which are assigned to assist
national accident investigation authorities at the scene of the accidents and
afterwards, and they insure that the accident reports do not sign off with
such comrments as "pilot error". Boeing, as well as other manufacturers, also
helps assure safety through its Service Bulletins (sometimes supplemented by
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FAA ADs) which alert airlines to potential dangerous conditions.
Pilot training is also included in the price of the aircraft, and the
manufacturers attempt to make sure that the new airlines' pilots are aware of
all safety procedures and have the proper type ratings before they return to
the line. They also encourage each airline to report all operational
incidents back to the manufacturer, that then can issue incident reports to
all the operators to insure that potentially dangerous incidents do not get
repeated. This incident reporting is especially necessary for airlines
operating in countries where such procedures are not mandatory.
The usefulness underlying such a reporting system is the same as that
discussed for trend analysis of GA incidents in the SDR system. McDonnell-
Douglas notes that
"if a data base is to be helpful in preventing accidents,
it should be used to predict significant safety trends.
Logic should be incorporated in the accident and incident
data system to enable the frequencies of a particular type
of occurrence ,to be calculated versus independent variables.
Thus, the system would be able to detect an aircraft, a mode of
operation, a part, a pilot profile or some combination of
variables which has a higher than predicted accident potential
frequency. These items would be automatically scanned at specified
intervals and whenever new reports were added to the data base. Any
specific events that occur too frequently to be considered a
normally acceptable rate would then trigger an alerting system to
warn of an inpending problem." (Clauzel, 1982)
McDonnell-Douglas also notes that a major deficiency of current data bases on
air carrier accidents is a lack of human behavior data before and during an
accident - data which admittedly is difficult to obtain but which would help
determine the reasons for the accidents and prevent further occurrences.
The airlines in general are split on the question of whether there
should be an overall safety officer responsible for all safety functions -
some see it as useful in having a department which focuses on safety and does
not get immersed in day-to-day operations; some feel that safety should be
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everybody's business and not be shunted aside to a special division.
Another murky area is the relationship between an airline's profit and
safety and its connection to human factors. Inferences have been drawn in a
number of approach and landing or takeoff accidents under marginal weather
conditions that pilots acted with the bottom line rather than safety being
foremost - they took off (or landed) to meet the schedule and try to deliver
the (paying) customers rather than wait (or divert). However, no correlation
has ever been shown linking an airline's profitability to its safety record.
Unless it is a spectacular airworthiness failure (the DC-10, most
recently), the popular press focuses not upon aircraft design but on other,
somewhat exogeneous, aspects of airline safety, most recently the ATC
environment and post-crash survival. Particularly since the 1981 Professional
Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) walkout, the ATC system safety
level has been under intense observation by various news organizations, the
NTSB, and, at least at the beginning, by the ex-controllers who were
determined to prove that the system was now unsafe without them. However, the
FAA was able to alleviate the effects of the strike by immediately going to
restrictions on flights at major airports (slots) and implementing flow
control procedures. Flow control, which limits the numbers of aircraft
departing for a specific airport, also saves fuel since airplanes are kept
waiting on the ground, rather than in the air circling or a landing slot (and
where controllers have to watch and vector them). To date there have been no
strike-related accidents as the ATC controller force is being reconstituted.
The other recent major non-technical development in the airline business
purported to affect safety has been the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) of
1978. The Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) has been particularly vocal on
this safety issue - "There's going to be a deregulation accident. It's just a
matter of time ... (Aviation Week &k Space Technology, 1984) - is a fairly
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low-key example of ALPA rhetoric. This issue of safety was repeatedly raised
in the great deregulation debates which preceded the Acty generally, however,
the point that the FAA was going to maintain safety standards, regardless of
the demise of the CAB, carried the day. Indeed, the Transportation
Secretary's annual report to Congress specifically covers the effect of
deregulation on air safety - no evidence of any adverse effects has yet been
cited. A recent rash of "operational errors" (planes coming closer than five
miles horizontally or 1,000 feet vertically) may be largely due to a new
'quality assurance" computer program which is detecting many slight, technical
infractions which the controllers would not have noticed in the past. These
increases in operational errors took place at installations where
modifications had been made to ATC computers to record operational errors
automaticallyl now, controllers are more stringently interpreting the
separation standards. The FAA contends, however, that the safety of the ATC
system had never been impaired and that these "operational errors" do not mean
potential danger to airplanes.
There is real debate whether the FAA's minimum standards of safety are
enough. According to ALPA: "The established carriers have learned the hard
way that they cannot operate at those minimum standards... Flight time, duty
time, maintenance practices, operational practices and procedures - they are
far and above the FARs" (Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1984). However,
the FAA claims that there are no airlines operating at the minimums anyway, in
effect making the whole argument moot.
One of the longest ongoing struggles between the FAA and the NI'SB, with
occasional kibitzing by Congress, concerns crashworthiness, in particularly
the flammability of aircraft interiors. Between 1965 and 1979 some 480 people
died in post-crash fires (1 out of 5 of all people killed in U.S. airplane
accidents). The problem is not just fire, but also toxic flames. Whereas
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flame-retardent aircraft interior materials (for seat, rug, wall and ceiling
materials), if and when made mandatory by the FAA, will delay the spread of
flames somewhat, little can be done regarding toxic fumes: a man's wool suit,
when burned, gives off enough cyanide to kill seven peoplel cotton emits
carbon monoxide (Newsweek, 1984). Once a fire starts inside the cabin, all
passengers become exposed to the dangerous fumes and quick evacuation becomes
the only solution. (Some debate still continues about the proper number of
exits required for rapid egress).
Finally, weather-related accidents continue to occur, amounting to some
forty percent of all aviation accidents. Although airlines (and airports)
normally halt operations in particularly bad weather, at all other times the
decision to start or continue a trip is left to the pilots, who may feel
themselves under psychological stress to meet schedules. It is at this
juncture of unstable weather conditions and pilot judgement that pilot error
is often said to occur and where safety analysis may be of potential help.
The point of the analysis should be to understand why the pilots undertook a
certain course of action, rather than just determining what had happenedi
whether it was fatigue, poor communications about weather phenomena, or other
causes of poor human performance.
-21-
4. Are Accidents Necessary?
Since the goal of aviation safety analysis is to improve safety, the
analyst is basically working to put himself out of business. But there have
been spokesmen advocating the point of view that "accidents are necessary to
maintain a certain level of safety" on the grounds that an absence of
accidents results in careless supervision or less compliance with proper
procedures (Interavia, 1979). This hardly makes sense if one accepts the
normal definition of an accident as a combination (or series) of relatively
trivial deviations from normal behavior, none of which would alone be the
cause, but each of which is a necessary ingredient in the final outcome.
(This of course excludes the approximately 10% of GA accidents attributed to
alcohol.)
In a further effort to understand human error in aviation, researchers
at NASA's Ames Research Center have attempted to use an analogue to the
"epidemiology" model. This model, used to analyze the causes of disease
propagation and its application to aviation, is shown in Figure 1. This model
allows the analyst to trace the series of events which lead to a (near)
accident, as shown in Figure 2. When analyzing the ASRS data base, the
researchers found the following basic types of error:
a) Perceptual Failure: A fault in the cognitive behavior by which one
gains awareness of the environment through physical sensation interpreted in
the light of experience and accumulated knowledgel incomplete understanding of
a situation.
b) Loss of Vigilance: A special form of perceptual failure wherein
subject fails to maintain alert watchfulness to avoid danger.
c) Faulty Exercise of Discretion: The making of an incorrect choice
among available alternative courses of actiony poor decision making.
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The epidemiological model and its aviaton system analogy
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d) Planning Failures: A special form of faulty discretion wherein
subject either fails to develop beforehand a scheme, program, or method for
accomplishing a goal, or adopts one that is flawed.
e) Failure in Operating Technique: Inadequate execution of an
operational task p related to skill deficiency in controlling, monitoring, or
comunicating.
Further analyses of the ASRS data base may indicate which of these
failures are capable of being through corrected additional training or
attitude awareness.
When there are two aircraft involved in a potentially dangerous
situation, the following events can occur, in order of severity (Billings and
O'Hare, 1978):
1. Collision
2. Near Collision: perilously close to colliding (depending on size,
type, speed of aircraft and relative courses). Men occurrence is
in the air, called "near mid-air".
3. Less than safe separation: a conflict occurs.
4. Recognized error: action taken in time to avoid conflict.
5. No conflict.
A useful way to summarize these occurrences is shown in Figure 3, which
identifies the phase of flight at the time of the potential two-aircraft
conflict. Analysis of the FAA's Near Mid-Air Collision Report data base using
Figure 3 as a guide to place and frequency of encounters may suggest ways to
reduce potentially dangerous mid-air situations.
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Figure 3
Phase of flight at time of Occurrence*
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5. What is to be done?
Further work appears warranted in the area of analysis of FAA and NASA
data bases. These public bases may be supplemented, where possible, by data
bases established by aircraft and engine manufacturers. Potential topics for
analysis have been discussed during the previous four chaptersi GA and air
carrier data bases are different enough to warrant separate approaches.
Analysis of data bases is of course not the only area where analytical
skills can be applied for potential safety improvements, but it is the most
visible due to the vast amounts of data currently being collected. (Further
analyses may suggest that too many, or the wrong type of, data are being
gathered.) Nevertheless, other topics only briefly noted earlier also deserve
further study.
These include issues within the ATC system, particularly separation
standards, congestion, capacity constraints, and flow controll regulatory
issues, particularly GA pilot requirements and conuter operations; and
weather related topics, such as frequency and adequacy of advisories and
forecasts, particularly of wind shear. Each issue is important - it is
largely up to the FAA to set priorities.
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Appendix A
by
R. John Hansman
Aviation Safety Analysis As Practiced by Aviation Insurance Underwriters
In an attempt to obtain an additional perspective into methods of
Aviation Safety Analysis, several of the major general aviation underwriters
were contacted. Discussions were held with individuals at varying levels of
corporate hierarchy in an attempt to determine what type of analysis was used
by the underwriters to determine rates and to avoid "bad risks".
The preliminary picture emerging from the discussions is that the
underwriters are very limited in their formal safety analysis. They operate
in what they describe as a "Seat of the Pants" or intuitive mode based
primarily on the experience and judgement of their individual underwriters.
It is, however, instructive to consider both the analysis that the
underwriters do consider worthwhile and their reasons for not pursuing more
formal safety analysis.
Some of the reasons given by the underwriters for their limited aviation
safety analysis are:
1. Insufficient Base for Statistical Analysis
With the general aviation fleet consisting of only 200,000 to
300,000 aircraft, and a large "spread' in their types and uses, it
is difficult to establish a statistical basis with a large degree
of confidence.
2. Large Number of Variables
Any attempt to analyze GA safety is hampered by the large number of
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significant factors ranging from pilot experience, equipment on
board, aircraft use, operational environment, weather and exposure.
3. Lack of Resources
Aviation underwriters are limited both in financial and actuarial
resources dedicated to safety analysis.
4. Competitive Market Considerations
Inasmuch as aviation underwriting is a conpetitive business,
analytical considerations clearly are secondary to competitive
marketing considerations. "Bad risks' are expected to be screened
by the individual underwriter and the rates are more or less set by
the entire market. General areas of high risk (e.g. piston engine
helicopters and light twins) will eventually be evident in higher
rates across the whole market, but these areas are apparent even
without detailed analysis.
5. Desire for Simplicity
Because of the large nunber of aircraft which need to be quoted on,
the underwriters are hesitant to increase complexity in the
underwritting process by including too many variables. This
results in requiring only a generally low resolution analysis
process.
The underwriters use primarily two indicators to measure risk and
underwritting success. They are:
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Value of the losses
Burning Ratio =
Value of the hulls
and
Value of claims
Loss Ratio =
Value of premiums
A third indicator is the combined ratio which is the loss ratio corrected for
business costs.
These indictors are analyzed by the underwriters, both internally using
the company data and for the market as a whole using NISB and FAA data. For
analysis, aircraft are grouped into basic categories, examples of which we
show in Table A-1. Analyses are also made by individual model types, as well
as being integrated over the entire fleet. Type of use is also considered and
typical categories are shown in Table A-2.
Detailed analysis is normally limited to the industrial aid category
where there is much commnality of operation and the per unit hull costs are
very high (I $1M). 'or the remainder of the GA fleet, analysis is primarily
done in a triggered mode where some factor initiates the analysis of a
specific model type. In one company, product liability claims often trigger
an analysis.
In setting rates, no specific correction is made for exposure. It is
assumed that exposure is uniform over a specific aircraft and use category,
and that any anomalies will be averaged out.
Pilot experience is considered to be an important factor by the
underwriters. In general, experience is expected to commensurate with the
aircraft category and the intended use. A list of the primary pilot
experience factors is shown in Table A-3. Normal breakdown is in 100 or 500
hour increments. It is interesting to note that such factors as recency of
experience and instrument time are not normally considered, due to the low
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fidelity of the analysis. It was, however, noted by the underwriters that
professional crew members (i.e. employees with no non-flying duties) and
simulator-based recurrency training programs were considered to hve a strong
positive effect on safety and were therefore encouraged, particularly in the
industrial aid category.
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Table A-1
Typical Aircraft Category Breakdown
Company A
Single Engine, Fixed Gear
Single Engine, Retractable
Light Twin
Cabin Class Twin
Turbine
Company B
Single Engine, Fixed Gear
Single Engine, Retractable
High Performance Single Engine (Turbo)
Light Twin
Heavy Twin
Turbine
1 0 b
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Table A-2
Typical Use Breakdwon
Business and Pleasure
Industrial Aid (Corporate)
Agricultural
Instructional
Manufacturers Hull and Liability
I Di
Table A-3
Primry Pilot Experience Factors
Ratings
Total Time
*Total Retractable Time
*Total Multi-Engine Time
*Only Inportant for that category of aircraft
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